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INTRODUCTION

"The patent laws [reward] innovation with a temporary
monopoly. The monopoly is a property right; and like any property
right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in
innovation."
-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy'
For nearly twenty years, engineers, inventors, and patent
attorneys operated in a world where a competent exculpatory patent
opinion could be the deciding factor in whether or not a finding of
willful patent infringement would be rendered by a court.' Under the
adverse inference rule, failure to disclose the opinion of patent
1. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
2. See infra Part II.
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counsel created an inference that the opinion would show that the
firm knew its proposed conduct potentially infringed upon an existing
patent.3 Such an inference easily led to a finding of willfulness4 and
brought with it a severe penalty of treble damages for willful

infringement.' Because of the threat of increased damages associated
with a finding of willful infringement, businesses were economically

encouraged to become aware of and avoid potentially infringing
activity.
However, after a longstanding existence in the area of patent
law, the adverse inference rule no longer exists. In its recent decision
in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,6

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made a
notable change to patent law by putting to rest the adverse inference

rule.7 This landmark decision reaffirmed the judicial sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege8 and, at the same time, created grave
uncertainty and unrest regarding the need for and usefulness of

patent opinions.
This Comment explores the effect of historical and current case
law on the risks, benefits, and obligations of a business to search for

and become aware of its competitors' patents and patent activities.
This Comment argues that the court should not have used Knorr3. See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Jon E. Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced
Damages-Evolution and Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 112 (2001) (describing
the Federal Circuit's definition of the adverse inference rule as "the conclusion that [the
accused infringer] either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its
importation and sale of the accused products would be an infringement of valid U.S.
patents").
4. See Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1580 ("If infringement be accidental or innocent,
increased damages are not awardable for the infringement. If infringement be willful,
increased damages 'may' be awarded at the discretion of the district court, and the amount
of increase may be set in the exercise of that same discretion."). Part II, infra, offers a
detailed discussion of the practical effects of the adverse inference rule.
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
6. 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
7. See id. at 1341. Prior to this appeal, the Federal Circuit asked the parties to brief
answers to four questions. Id. The first two questions were: (1) "When the attorney-client
privilege ... is invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate ... to draw

an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?" and (2) "When the defendant
had not obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect
to willful infringement?" Id. at 1344-45. The court answered both of these questions in
the negative. Id.
8. The crux of the court's opinion was the inherent friction between the adverse
inference rule and the attorney-client privilege. The court admitted that "[t]hroughout
[the] evolution [of the adverse inference rule] the focus was not on attorney-client
relationships, but on disrespect for law. However, implementation of [the rule] has
resulted in inappropriate burdens on the attorney-client relationship." Id. at 1343.
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Bremse as an opportunity to overturn the adverse inference rule, but
instead the court should have used the case as a chance to bring
precision to the scope of the waiver of attorney-client privilege. The
court's overemphasis on the attorney-client privilege muddled the
duty of care associated with willful patent infringement. Abolishing
the adverse inference rule was unnecessary, not only because the
problems with the rule could have been resolved more narrowly, but
also because the adverse inference rule furthers the goals of the
proposed efficiency theory of the patent system.
Part I of this Comment offers a brief background of the facts of
the Knorr-Bremse case. Part II reviews the law as it existed under the
adverse inference rule. Because the implementation of the adverse
inference rule tends to result in a finding of willful infringement,
accused infringers had a strong incentive to avoid the rule-even if
this meant waiving the attorney-client privilege and disclosing an
opinion of patent counsel. Part III explores the friction the adverse
inference rule created with the attorney-client privilege. Because the
disclosure of an opinion of counsel operates as privilege waiver,
questions abound regarding the scope of that waiver. Thus, Part III
offers an alternative solution that focuses on the scope of the waiver
rather than the adverse inference itself. Part IV proposes a theory of
efficiency to guide the use of the adverse inference rule. Part IV
further offers a critique of the Knorr-Bremse decision and explains
why the adverse inference rule should not have been abolished.
I. BACKGROUND

Knorr-Bremse is a foreign corporation that manufactures air disk
brakes for large commercial trucks, such as tractor-trailers.9 Haldex is
also a foreign company that manufactures air brakes. Dana is an
American corporation that contracted with Haldex to sell in the
United States air brakes manufactured by Haldex in Sweden. 10 In
1998, Knorr-Bremse orally notified Dana that it was involved in a
patent dispute with Haldex in Europe over the air brake design Dana
was selling in the United States." A year later, Knorr-Bremse gave
Dana written notification that a patent was issued to Knorr-Bremse
on the aforementioned air brake design and that Knorr-Bremse had
commenced a patent infringement action against Haldex.12 A

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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separate suit was filed in the United States in May 2000." In
November 2000, Knorr-Bremse's motion for summary judgment of
patent infringement was granted.14 However, in the United States,
Dana and Haldex continued to operate trucks containing the

infringing air brakes. 5 The continued acts of infringement by Haldex
formed the basis for Knorr-Bremse's claim of willful infringement.
On the issue of willfulness, Haldex mentioned that it had obtained an
opinion from both European and United States counsel regarding

Knorr-Bremse's patent but refused to disclose any opinions at trial,
asserting the attorney-client privilege.16 Dana, on the other hand, did

not obtain an opinion of counsel at all but instead relied on Haldex's
position. 7
The trial court applied the adverse inference rule to conclude

that the failure to disclose an opinion meant that the opinions were
unfavorable to Haldex and Dana. 8 Ultimately, the court held that
Dana and Haldex willfully infringed Knorr-Bremse's patent rights. 19

The court purported to apply a totality of the circumstances test,
under which the failure to obtain or disclose an exculpatory opinion
of patent counsel created an adverse inference as to the culpability of

the alleged infringer." Although the adverse inference rule forms but
one part of the totality of the circumstances test, it is clear that the
adverse inference rule almost single-handedly determined the
outcome of Knorr-Bremse's willful infringement action.2' On appeal,
the facts of this case presented the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit22 with the opportunity to reconsider its precedent

13. Id.
14. Id. at 1342.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 133 F. Supp.
2d 843, 862 (E.D. Va. 2001) (explaining that "where, as here, an infringer refuses to
produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel in response to a charge of willful infringement,
an inference may be drawn that either no opinion was obtained or, if it was, that it was an
unfavorable opinion"), vacated, 383 F.3d 1337 (2004) (en banc).
19. Id. at 862-63.
20. Id.
21. Id at 862 ("A finding of willful infringement of a patent is determined by a totality
of the circumstances surrounding the infringement.").
22. The Federal Circuit is the forum for most patent appeals. See 35 U.S.C. § 141
(2000) ("An applicant dissatisfied with the decision in an appeal to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ... may appeal the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (asserting the Federal
Circuit's authority to hear appeals on cases arising under § 1338); id. § 1338(a) (giving
district courts original jurisdiction for civil action claims of patent infringement).
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with respect to the adverse inference rule.23 Hearing the case en
banc, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of willful
infringement 24 and abolished the adverse inference rule. 25 The crux of
the court's reasoning for abolishing the rule was that the use of the
adverse inference rule had created "inappropriate burdens on the
attorney-client relationship. '26

The court did not address the burdens that the absence of the
adverse inference rule would impose on the enforcement of patent
rights. Despite the Federal Circuit's failure to address the issue, its

ruling has a direct impact on the efficiency of the patent system.
Traditional theories of the patent system attempt to explain how and
why the United States Patent Office ultimately issues patents. 27 A

proper view of the patent system not only encompasses how and why
patents are obtained, but also offers insight into what is required to
perpetuate the patent system. The efficiency theory proposed in this

Comment contributes to the ongoing scholarship regarding patent
system efficiency. 28 The primary concern of the proposed efficiency
theory is allocating benefits and burdens in a manner that best
promotes the efficient operation of the patent system.

23. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
24. Id. at 1341.
25. Id. at 1344 ("The adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been
unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory
opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted. Precedent authorizing such inference is
overruled.").
26. Id. at 1343.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. See generally Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed ReDefinition of "First-to-Invent," 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 760 (1998) (arguing that "by redefining first-to-invent to be synonymous with first-to-reduce-to-practice, the U.S. patent
system will achieve greater efficiency without sacrificing the nation's creative spirit");
Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for PatentMisuse, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 399, 400 (2003) (arguing that because the paramount concern of the patent system is
the benefit to society rather than the benefit to an individual inventor, limiting an
individual patent enhances the overall efficiency of the patent system); Michelle Armond,
Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions for Preliminary
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. REV. 117, 121-22 (2003)
(suggesting that an individual invention defense is in harmony with other academic
proposals arguing for increasing the economic efficiency of the overall patent system);
Kevin J. Kelly, Comment, Placing the Burden Back Where It Belongs: A Proposal To
Eliminate the Affirmative Duty from Willful Infringement Analyses, 4 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 521-22 (2005) (arguing that the affirmative duty requirement in
willful infringement analyses has a negative effect on the efficiency of technological
advancement).
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II. THE BIRTH OF THE ADVERSE INFERENCE RULE
A.

PatentInfringement

The patent system grants a property right to inventors in the
form of a patent-a monopoly of limited duration. 19 A patent is

infringed when someone "without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention ... during the term of the
patent."3 Courts are empowered to award damages "adequate to
compensate for the infringement."3 1 Under the Patent Act, courts are
also permitted to award increased damages.32 The enhanced damages

are not only compensatory but can also be punitive in nature.3 3 This
allows courts the discretion to compensate patentees for damages

they have suffered while punishing infringers for, and deterring
potential infringers from, engaging in infringing conduct. 4 Enhanced
damages awards also allow courts to strike a balance between legal
and equitable concerns.3 Typically, the enhanced
damages provision
36
is applied in cases of willful infringement.
Willfulness is a legal term of art that signifies deliberate and
intentional conduct.37 The use of the enhanced damages penalty in
cases of willful infringement indicates Congress's desire to punish
those who intentionally infringe the legal rights of others.3 8 The law
29. See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 1998)
("Patent law seeks to foster and reward invention by providing the inventor with a
monopoly of limited duration; in return for that reward, the inventor must disclose his
invention and dedicate it to the public." (emphasis added)). Under the current Act,
patent rights extend twenty years from the effective filing date of the patent application.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
31. Id. § 284.
32. Id. A finding of willfulness does not automatically guarantee increased damages.
The Federal Circuit has held that "a finding of willful infringement merely authorizes, but
does not mandate, an award of increased damages." Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang,
Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc.,
917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
33. See SRI Int'l Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 183 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
34. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
35. Amsted, 24 F.3d at 184 (explaining that enhanced damages serve not only a
punitive role, but also address the equities as between the patentee and infringer (citing
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
36. SRI Int'l, 127 F.3d at 1468.
37. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988).
38. Congress elected to punish willful infringers according to the relative weight
society assigns to the obligations of the parties involved in the patent system. This general
notion plays a role in the efficiency theory of the patent system discussed in Part IV, infra.
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imposes an affirmative duty to exercise due care to avoid infringing
the known patent rights of others.3 9 When a party fails to take
reasonable steps to avoid potentially infringing activity, that party
risks being held liable for willful infringement.4" However, a willful
infringement analysis is not a bright line test. A finding of willfulness
requires an inquiry into the culpability of the accused infringer.4"
There are several different degrees of culpability, all of which affect
the willfulness analysis.42 Each case will be different, and the level of
culpability will fall at different points on the continuum given the
specific facts of a particular case.43 Because of this wide culpability
range, a finding of willful infringement must be based on the totality
of the circumstances.'
Courts have articulated nine factors to be considered in the
totality of the circumstances test:
(i) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design
of another; (ii) whether the infringer, when he knew of the
other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent
and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was
not infringed; (iii) whether the infringer engaged in
inappropriate behavior in the course of the litigation; (iv) the
infringer's size and financial condition; (v) the closeness of the
infringement and validity issues; (vi) the duration of the
infringer's misconduct; (vii) any remedial action by the
infringer; (viii) the infringer's motivation for continuing

39. See Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002); LNP Eng'g
Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting

Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics, Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2001)); Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
40. See SRI Int'l, 127 F.3d at 1464-65.

41. Id. (explaining that "the primary consideration is whether the infringer, acting in
good faith and upon due inquiry, had sound reason to believe that it had the right to act in
the manner that was found to be infringing" (emphasis added)).
42. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(" 'Willfulness' in infringement, as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of degree.
It recognizes that infringement may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or
reckless, disregard of a patentee's legal rights.").
43. Id. at 1126.
44. See Electro Med. Sys., 34 F.3d at 1056; Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Dart
Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The consequences of a finding of willful
infringement being serious, such a finding.., is to be made only after due consideration of
the totality of the circumstances.").

1056

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

infringing conduct in the face of knowledge of the patent; and
(ix) whether the infringer attempted to conceal its misconduct.45
Courts have also noted that "intent and reasonable beliefs are
the primary focus of a willful infringement inquiry. 4 6 The first two
factors of the multifactor test-whether the infringer deliberately
copied or whether the infringer investigated the scope of patent
protection once he knew of the patent's existence-are the only two
factors that give any treatment to the infringer's affirmative duty to
avoid infringing activity.47 This is significant because without a clear
indication of what the duty of care is, enforcing that duty is almost
always futile. And if the duty cannot be enforced, the patent rights
granted by the patent system are rendered meaningless.
The
deliberate copying and subsequent investigation factors highlight the
duty to avoid infringing activity. In terms of investigative measures, a
court considers these subsequent actions as they relate to forming a
good-faith belief that the patent is in some way defective. The test
focuses on the defectiveness of the patent itself and not on what
actions should be taken to avoid infringing the patent.
In order for a potential infringer to demonstrate the
reasonableness of his belief that his proposed course of conduct is
noninfringing, the potential infringer should be required to take some
investigative action prior to engaging in the proposed activity. An
affirmative duty to avoid infringing activity has no meaning if such
prior investigation is not required. Taking investigative measures
after engaging in infringing conduct or in preparation for trial would
be inadequate. Consequently, the Federal Circuit began interpreting
the duty of care as including a "duty to seek and obtain competent
legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible
infringing activity."48 The Federal Circuit's emphasis on prior action
45. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 133 F. Supp.
2d 843, 862 (E.D. Va. 2001), vacated, 383 F.3d 1337 (3rd Cir. 2004) (en banc); see also
Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(applying same test); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(applying same test).
46. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
47. Although the subject of this Comment is the efficiency of the patent system, other
concerns abound when deciding how to allocate liability for the infringement of a patent.
These concerns include distributional concerns, degrees of fault, and other justice
considerations. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,

1093-1105 (1972) (positing that the reasons a society selects a set of entitlements include
economic efficiency, wealth distribution, and other justice considerations).
48. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also LNP Eng'g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1357
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reinforces the notion that potential infringers have a duty to become
aware of the patent activity of their competitors before attempting to
enter the field of competition, and if the competitor has beaten the
infringer to the Patent Office, the infringer must stay off of the field.49
B.

An Exculpatory Opinion
A patent opinion, though, may give a potential infringer

reasonable grounds for entering the field-but not just any opinion
will do. The opinion must be competent and timely, and the accused
infringer must reasonably rely on the opinion." The timeliness of the
opinion relates to the Federal Circuit's temporal requirement that the
opinion be obtained before an accused infringer engages in infringing
activity. Because the infringer has a duty to avoid infringing activity,"
an opinion obtained after engaging in improper conduct would not
itself rebut a claim of willfulness.52
5 3 the
For example, in Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro,
district court held that the patent opinions obtained by CellPro were

not sufficient to indicate good faith.54 With respect to timing, the
court noted:
The opinions were not prepared at a time when the CellPro
Board was considering whether to proceed with the apparently
infringing work. Rather, the opinions were prepared after
(Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Usually, this duty of due care requires a potential infringer to obtain
competent legal advice before continuing its potentially infringing activities."); Comark
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that the
duty "requires the potential infringer to obtain competent legal advice before engaging in
any activity that could infringe another's patent rights").
49. Even though Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004), overturned the
adverse inference rule, the duty of care, or what is left of it, is apparently still required.
See, e.g., Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that "[aictual notice of another's patent rights triggers an
affirmative duty of care"). Therefore, businesses are still somewhat obligated to become
aware of and avoid infringing the patent rights of their competitors. This Comment takes
the position that without the incentive to conduct a thorough prior art search and obtain a
competent opinion from a qualified patent attorney, which was imposed by the adverse
inference rule, declaring that businesses still have the duty to become aware of and avoid
the patent rights of others is essentially meaningless. For a broader discussion of what is
left of the duty of care requirement, see infra Part IV.B.
50. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(reiterating the district court's reason for finding willful infringement based on the fact
that the opinions were "untimely, not competent, and not relied upon").
51. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.
52. Id. at 1390 (explaining that the duty requires a potential infringer to obtain an
opinion of counsel "before the initiation of any possible infringing activity").
53. 978 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997), affd 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
54. Id. at 194.
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those business decisions had been made. The opinions appear
to have been prepared for two other reasons: to assist CellPro
in raising funds and to immunize the company from a claim for
enhanced damages."
Arguably, the most important aspect of a patent opinion is its
competence. In Comark Communications,Inc. v. Harris Corp.,5 6 the
Federal Circuit offered its rationale behind the competence
requirement:
The reason a potential defendant obtains an opinion from
counsel is to ensure that it acts with due diligence in avoiding
activities which infringe the patent rights of others. Obtaining
an objective opinion letter from counsel also provides the basis
for a defense against willful infringement. In order to provide
such a prophylactic defense, however, counsel's opinion must
be premised upon the best information known to the defendant.

Otherwise, the opinion is likely to be inaccurate and will be
ineffective to indicate the defendant's good faith intent.
Whenever material information is intentionally withheld, or the
best information is intentionally not made available to counsel
during the preparation of the opinion, the opinion can no
longer serve its prophylactic purpose of negating a finding of
willful infringement. 7
The potential infringer is charged with disclosing the best
information it has available to the lawyer, and the lawyer, in turn, is
charged with producing a reasoned legal opinion based upon that
information. The objectivity of the patent opinion is essential for
reasonable reliance 8 upon that opinion. As with any other legal
analysis, it is not necessary that the opinion reach the correct legal
conclusion (or the same conclusion that the court ultimately
reaches),59 but the opinion must provide a reasoned and unbiased
55. Id.
56. 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
57. Id. at 1191 (emphasis added).
58. It is not enough for the patent opinion to suggest that the infringer's conduct
poses no legal problems. The opinion must be objective and unbiased such that it puts the
infringer on notice of the relevant legal issues arising from the proposed course of
conduct. See Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transp. Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 197, 240
(N.D.N.Y. 2004) ("A client's reliance on an opinion is reasonable so long as the opinion
contains 'sufficient internal indicia of creditability.'" (quoting Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
59. See Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that in
determining the competency of a patent opinion "[w]hether or not an opinion was 'legally'

THE ADVERSE INFERENCERULE

2006]

1059

review of the relevant prior art, 60 offer a discussion of case law, and

to the type of conduct that could possibly be
make reference
61
infringing.
The CellPro court also addressed the substance of the patent

opinions in that case. The court found that the opinions did not
reference the burden of proof CellPro would face at trial in order to
show that the plaintiff's patents were invalid.6' Also, one opinion
concluded that the plaintiff's patent on cell suspensions was invalid

because it was anticipated by three prior art references included in
the patent opinion.63 However, none of the three prior art references
the opinion claimed to have used to anticipate the plaintiff's invention

even referred to cell suspensions. 6 These grave deficiencies in the
opinions' substantive analyses resulted in the rejection of the patent
opinions.
The patent opinion that was the subject of the willful
infringement analysis in Westvaco Corp. v. InternationalPaper Co.,65
on the other hand, was held to be timely, reliable, and competent. 66
In Westvaco, the patent counsel began each opinion letter "with a

statement that the opinion is based on a review of the file history of
the patent, the prior art of record, and additional prior art."'67 Also,

the

opinion

did

not

make

broad,

unsupported,

conclusory

correct is not the proper focus"); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 830 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that just because "counsel's opinion turned out to be contrary to our
judgment ... does not make his advice regarding [the] patent incompetent"); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that the importance
of a patent opinion "does not depend upon its legal correctness").
60. The phrase "prior art" is a patent term of art that signifies inventions, patents, and
other works that have been placed in the public domain at a time prior to the filing of a
particular patent application in question. 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: Glossary (1944)
(defining prior art) [hereinafter CHISUM Glossary]. Prior art is used to test the
innovativeness and priority of inventions that are the subject of patent applications. Id.
Prior art has been defined as "includ[ing] (1) information in applications for previously
patented inventions; (2) information that was published more than one year before a
patent application is filed; and (3) information in other patent applications and inventor's
certificates filed more than a year before the application is filed." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 119 (8th ed. 2004).
61. See Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 743-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("In
considering the reasonableness of the accused infringer's reliance on an opinion of
counsel, the opinion letter should be reviewed for its 'overall tone, its discussion of case
law, its analysis of the particular facts and its reference to inequitable conduct.' " (quoting
Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944)).
62. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 194 (D. Del. 1997).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 991 F.2d 735 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
66. Id. at 744.
67. Id.
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statements.68 Instead, the opinion analyzed the relevant infringement
issues with a detailed discussion of the prior art and claimed
inventions. 69 Furthermore, the court noted that "[a]n opinion of
counsel ...need not unequivocally state that the client will not be

held liable for infringement. An honest opinion is more likely to
speak of probabilities than certainties."70 The patent opinions
Westvaco obtained in that case did not make statements of certainty.
Rather, the opinions were couched in terms of probabilities-stating
the likelihood of the claimed invention being held invalid or not
infringed.71 Because of the timeliness and competence of these
opinion letters, as well as the patent attorney's detailed analyses and
qualified conclusions, the court held that these opinions were
justifiably relied upon.72

It is important to note, however, that simply obtaining an opinion
from patent counsel is not enough to avert a claim of willful
infringement. 73 Because of the totality of the circumstances test, a
patent opinion is only one factor used to determine willfulness. 74
Specifically, obtaining a timely, reliable, and competent patent
opinion only satisfies the investigation factor enumerated in the
totality of the circumstances test.75 Even if an infringer receives and
reasonably relies on a patent opinion, the infringer is not completely
shielded from a finding of willful infringement.76 While obtaining a
patent opinion alone is not enough to defeat a claim of willfulness,
under the adverse inference rule, failing to obtain an opinion was
practically enough to ensure a finding of willfulness.77

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 744-45.
73. See id. at 744.
74. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
76. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Legal advice is only one factor to be considered on the
question of willfulness and an opinion of counsel does not guarantee against a finding of
willfulness.").
77. See infra Part II.D (discussing the practical effects of the adverse inference rule).
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C. Adverse Inference Rule
The basic premise of the duty to avoid infringement is the duty to
respect the law.78 The law affords patents a presumption of validity7 9

and confers upon patentees the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the patented inventions.8" Before the adverse
inference rule, and even before the creation of the Federal Circuit,
enforcing these presumptively valid patent rights was futile.8 1
Businesses would blatantly infringe patentees' rights and some would

even neglect to obtain an exculpatory patent opinion prior to
engaging in potentially infringing conduct.82 When faced with a claim
of willful infringement, these businesses would assert the attorney-

client privilege in order to escape having to disclose that they did not
obtain opinion of counsel.83 Businesses would argue that a patent

opinion is a communication between lawyer and client that is
protected by the privilege.' 4 While this is certainly true, by asserting
the privilege and refusing to disclose the opinion, these businesses
made it difficult for courts to determine if advice from counsel was

even sought or what that advice consisted of if it was indeed
obtained.

This practically shielded accused infringers from any real

inquiry into the duty of care requirement and complicated the willful
infringement analysis. The court had no way to assess the culpability
78. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) ("Fundamental to determination of willful
infringement is the duty to act in accordance with law.").
79. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
80. Id. § 154(a)(1).
81. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (explaining that "[r]einforcement of [the duty
to avoid patent infringement] was a foundation of the formation of the Federal Circuit
court, at a time when widespread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national
innovation incentive").
82. For example, in Underwater Devices, the alleged infringer relied on the advice of
its in-house counsel to "refuse to even discuss the payment of a royalty" to the patentee
without seeking advice of patent counsel or even conducting an inquiry into the validity of
the patent. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
83. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct protect against the disclosure of
confidential communications between lawyer and client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
84. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344 (stating that "this court has never suggested
that opinions of counsel concerning patents are not privileged").
85. In Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
the alleged infringer refused to disclose either whether it obtained opinion of patent
counsel before engaging in the infringing conduct or the content of any patent opinion.
The court in that case held that "[wihere the infringer fails to introduce an exculpatory
opinion ... a court must be free to infer that either no opinion was obtained or, [that the
opinion] was contrary to the infringer's desire to initiate or continue its use of the
patentee's invention." Id. at 1572-73.
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of the accused infringer without knowing whether the accused in fact
received an opinion or what the content of such an opinion was.
If the duty of care requires that reasonable steps be taken to
avoid infringing activity, the inability to find out what advice was
given by a patent attorney or whether advice was even requested
omits a vital component of the duty of care analysis. In essence,
without some mechanism in place to force the disclosure of this vital
information, little is left with respect to the duty of care. Thus patent
attorneys are essentially the guardians of the patent system. Society
depends on their competent, unbiased opinions for the smooth
operation of the system. Without access to these opinions, courts are
left blind as to what measures are reasonable to avoid infringing the
presumptively valid rights of a patentee. By allowing the assertion of
the attorney-client privilege to thwart the adverse inference, the
attorney-client privilege essentially serves as both a sword and a
shield.86 Equipped with the privilege, an infringer can be confident
that if brought into court, the privilege would shield the infringer
from liability for willfulness. The assertion of the attorney-client
privilege in avoiding the disclosure of patent opinions not only
cripples patent lawyers with respect to their roles in the patent system
but also affords infringers an avenue to disrespect the legal rights of
patentees, while avoiding the taxing penalty for willfulness.
Keenly aware of this widespread disrespect for the law, the
Federal Circuit began requiring potential infringers to obtain an
opinion from counsel.87 In Underwater Devices Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen Co.,' the Federal Circuit held that "a potential infringer ...
has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or
not he is infringing."8 9 This "includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and
obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of
any possible infringing activity."' However, the Underwater Devices
court reasoned that the duty to obtain the opinion of counsel is
triggered only after "a potential infringer has actual notice of
86. But see Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E'Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (D.
Nev. 2003) ("Fundamental fairness compels the conclusion that a litigant may not use
reliance on advice of counsel to support a claim or defense as a sword in litigation, and
also deprive the opposing party the opportunity to test the legitimacy of that claim by
asserting the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine as a shield.").
87. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.
88. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
89. Id. at 1389-90.
90. Id. (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc'ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 415
F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (6th Cir. 1969); Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386
F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1030 (1968)).
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another's patent rights."'" Because no attorney-client privilege issue
was presented in that case, the court did not address what effect, if
any, an assertion of the privilege would have on a finding of
willfulness.
The court did, however, get the opportunity to address the issue
in Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc.' In Kloster, the accused
infringer engaged in the type of conduct that plagued the field of
patent law at that time by importing into the United States infringing
products with hopes that the relevant patents would be held invalid. 93
At trial, facing a claim of willful infringement, the accused infringer
did not even assert that it obtained an opinion from counsel after
being put on actual notice of the patentee's rights.9 4 Arguably, the
receipt of an opinion in that case would have served as evidence of
good faith to rebut the culpability element of willfulness. Instead, the
accused infringer in the Kloster case asserted the attorney-client
privilege and neglected to disclose or even mention receiving advice
from counsel. 95
The Kloster court, in response to this apparent disrespect for the
law, pronounced that "silence on the subject, in alleged reliance on
the attorney-client privilege, would warrant the conclusion that [the
accused] either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was
advised that its [conduct] would be an infringement of valid U.S.
patents." 96 This was the first time the court addressed the issue of
attorney-client privilege as it relates to a potential infringer's duty to
obtain a patent opinion. With no prior decision existing to this effect,
the court's pronouncement settled a great deal of confusion as to
what role the privilege played in the analysis of willfulness. Because
of the effect the court's pronouncement in Kloster had on the field of
patent law, the Federal Circuit reinforced the rule two years later in
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co.97 The Fromson court
held that "[w]here the infringer fails to introduce an exculpatory
opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to infer that either no
91. UnderwaterDevices, 717 F.2d at 1389 (emphasis added). This Comment disagrees
with the notion that actual notice should be required to trigger the duty to obtain opinion
from counsel. In Part IV, infra, this Comment proposes a view of the patent system that
requires a standing duty of care on the part of potential patentees and the general public
alike to become aware of and avoid infringing the valid patent rights of others-a duty
that is immediately triggered at the time a patent is granted.
92. 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 1580.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary
to the infringer's desire to initiate or continue its use of the patentee's
invention. ' 98 Because the attorney-client privilege was widely being
used as both a sword and shield in promoting disregard for patent
rights, something needed to be done to strengthen the duty of care.
So began the life of the adverse inference rule-a measure designed
to ensure proper respect for legal patent rights.
The birth of the adverse inference rule created a new wrinkle in
the willful patent infringement analysis. The nine-factor totality of
the circumstances test 99 still determined the direction of the analysis,
but the adverse inference rule directly affected the outcome of factors
two and nine of the multifactor test. Factor two deals with whether
the infringer "investigated the scope of the patent and formed a goodfaith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed."'" ° Factor
nine addresses "whether the infringer attempted to conceal its
misconduct."'' 1 When the attorney-client privilege is asserted, the
infringer chooses not to disclose an opinion of counsel. Absent
disclosure, there is no way for the court to assess what investigative
measures were taken by the accused infringer. Before the adverse
inference rule, the analysis would stall for lack of an answer to this
question. The adverse inference rule provided the court with an
answer: the accused did not take any investigative steps, or if steps
were taken, the resulting opinion was unfavorable to the accused.0 2
In terms of factor nine, the adverse inference rule reflected the
common sense notion that if you are refusing to disclose information,
then you must be hiding something, and particularly something
potentially adverse to your interests. Although the rule only directly
affected these two factors, the effect was so powerful that the adverse
inference rule had great influence and control over the overall willful
infringement analysis. 103
D. The PracticalEffect of the Adverse Inference Rule

This Comment posits that the adverse inference rule only served
as an incentive for increasing awareness of and respect for legal

98. Id. at 1572-73 (citing Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579-80).
99. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
100. See supra text accompanying note 45.
101. See supra text accompanying note 45.
102. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 579 ("In the present case, the totality of the circumstances, including the
failure to seek advice of counsel makes any finding of non-willfulness clearly erroneous
"(emphasis
....
added)).
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patent rights. In the abstract, the totality of the circumstances
analysis would ensure that the adverse inference rule does not solely
dictate which way a willful infringement assessment would turn. 1°4
The failure to obtain a patent opinion, and thus drawing an adverse
inference, theoretically would not in and of itself constitute an
ultimate finding of willful infringement.1 05 At least it should not be
the single determining factor under a totality of the circumstances
analysis.0 6 However, while obtaining the opinion of counsel was only
one consideration in the totality of the circumstances test for
willfulness, 7 the reality of the adverse inference rule proved to be
quite different. The enormous weight given to the adverse inference
practically mandated that businesses obtain a patent opinion.10 8
According to the American Bar Association, the practical effect
of the adverse inference rule presented "an accused infringer with a
Hobson's choice: [the accused] must either waive the [attorneyclient] privilege and disclose the advice of counsel, or assert the
privilege and be presumed to have received no opinion or an adverse
opinion."'1 9 The potentially devastating financial consequences of
treble damages for willful infringement very often made the decision
to obtain and disclose opinion of counsel "unavoidable."' .0 The
American Bar Association further argued in its amicus brief in KnorrBremse that the adverse inference rule also created an ethical
dilemma for lawyers in that it caused lawyers to give "sanitized"
opinions rather than candid and objective opinions."' Naturally, a
104. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that "[tihere is no per se rule that an opinion letter from patent counsel will
necessarily preclude a finding of willful infringement .... nor is there a per se rule that the
lack of such a letter necessarily requires a finding of willfulness" (citations omitted)).
105. Kloster, 793 F.2d at1579.
106. See id. (citing King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).

107. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 3, at 112 (stating that "the combination of the
affirmative duty rule and the adverse inference rule strongly suggest that potential
infringers should obtain a competent opinion of counsel upon notice of a competitor's
possible patent rights" (emphasis added)).
109. Corrected Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 5, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (No. 01-1357) (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 57
U.S.P.Q.2d 1442, 1443 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). The ABA argued in opposition to the adverse
inference rule. Id. at 2-3.
110. Id.

111. Id. at 5-6; see generally Imron T. Aly, Note, Encouraging Unprofessionalism: The
Magic Wand of the Patent InfringementOpinion, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593 (1999)

(arguing that the patent opinion "requirement" encourages unprofessionalism). The basis
for the ABA's argument is that because lawyers expect the forced disclosure of their
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major conflict regarding the attorney-client privilege is present when
clients are forced to disclose communications with their lawyers who

are being "forced" to sidestep their objectivity. Since the policies
surrounding the adverse inference rule are different from those

surrounding the attorney-client privilege," 2 the intersection of these
two concepts creates friction that is arguably unavoidable.
III. ADVERSE INFERENCE RULE VERSUS ATrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

A.

Background on Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is a bedrock principle in our judicial
system.

The United States Supreme Court has characterized the

privilege as a mechanism by which open and honest communications
between lawyer and client are both encouraged and protected." 3 The

Federal Circuit has coined it "a basic, time-honored privilege."''

4

The

attorney-client privilege reaches across the various legal disciplines.
The basic premise is simple: what is said between a lawyer and a
client should stay between the lawyer and client unless the client
explicitly desires otherwise." 5 Its place in the area of patent law is no
different.11 6 With the adverse inference rule in place, however, no
opinions at trial, lawyers are inclined to substitute candor for advocacy in an effort to
better protect their clients and minimize the risk of exposure to willful infringement. See
Corrected Brief of the American Bar Ass'n, supra note 109, at 3-4 (stating that the
"absence of confidentiality ... also discourages lawyers from providing cautionary advice
that they know may later be used to their clients' detriment" (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 226 (2d Cir. 1999))). This argument assumes that lawyers are
bound more by the desires of their clients than by the ABA's own Rules of Professional
Conduct. In Part IV, infra, this Comment argues that reliance on the ABA's argument
presents a serious flaw in the rationale for abolishing the adverse inference rule. The fact
that the adverse inference rule complicates the position of potential infringers should not
give lawyers just cause for sidestepping their duty to give candid advice.
112. See infra Part III.
113. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege is "the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law" and explaining that the privilege "encourages full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients").
114. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
115. See generally Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (explaining the basic premise of the
attorney-client privilege). There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. Lawyers
are allowed to reveal information necessary to prevent a client's commission of a crime
and to establish a defense in an action by the client against the lawyer. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (2003).
116. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that "a special rule affecting attorney-client
relationships in patent cases is not warranted").
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effect is given to the underlying reasons for the attorney-client
privilege whenever the privilege is asserted in a willful infringement
action.
Clients may not "desire" to disclose the contents of
confidential communications between themselves and their patent
lawyers, but the adverse inference rule typically made it the most
economically sound decision. 1 7 Once the privilege is waived in order
to disclose a patent opinion, the client relinquishes the shield of the
privilege."8
B.

Scope of Waiver

The scope of the waiver is probably the most damaging aspect of
the adverse inference rule's effect on the attorney-client privilege.
Under the adverse inference rule, while it is certain that an accused
infringer's assertion of the advice of counsel defense operates as a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege,1 9 there is no settled doctrine
as to how to treat the waiver of attorney-client privilege when such12a0
defense is asserted. Some courts have taken a very broad approach
to the waiver while other courts have attempted to narrow the
scope.121 The courts that have attempted to narrow the scope of the
waiver understand that if the waiver is defined too broadly, parties
117. See supra Part II.D.
118. See Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1416 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("Once the attorney-client privilege has been waived, the privilege is generally lost
for all purposes and in all forums.").
119. See Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F.2d 212, 215 (D. Mass.
2000) ("There is no question ... that when a party asserts an advice of counsel defense,
the result is at least some waiver of the attorney-client and work-product privileges.");
Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., No. C-91-1092 TEH (PJH), 1992 WL
442892, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 1992) ("A survey of patent case law has convinced this
court that the use of the advice of counsel defense waives the attorney client privilege.");
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Sigma Chem. Co., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1946, 1948 (D. Del. 1988)
(stating that "the attorney-client privilege may be waived if the client discloses part of a
privileged communication or if the client relies on the advice of counsel as an essential
element of his defense").
120. See Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating that "voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney communication
constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communications on the same
subject" (emphasis added)); AKEVA L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422
(M.D.N.C. 2003) (stating that "the client relying on advice of counsel waives attorneyclient privilege with respect to the entire subject matter of the waiver and not just the
specific opinion letter proffered" (emphasis added)).
121. Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (D. Mich. 1991)
(stating that the scope of the waiver in patent cases is generally construed narrowly);
Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977) ("The privilege or
immunity has been found to be waived only if facts relevant to a particular, narrow subject
matter have been disclosed in circumstances in which it would be unfair to deny the other
party an opportunity to discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter.").
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are likely to forgo the waiver and refuse to disclose any information
at all.122 Therefore, these courts have restricted the waiver to
documents and communications between the lawyer and client that
only relate to a narrowly defined subject matter, such as willfulness
alone.12 3 Interpreted broadly, however, courts have held that "[o]nce
the attorney-client privilege has been waived, the privilege is
generally lost for all purposes and in all forums." '2 4 Under this broad
definition of the waiver, once an accused infringer waives the
privilege, it opens the door to discovery of all communications with
all lawyers relating to the advice given, including trial counsel. 2 ' The
stated reason for such a broad scope of the privilege waiver is the
security of fundamental fairness.12 6 As one court explains:
Fairness dictates that a party may not use the attorney-client
privilege as both a sword and a shield. A party, therefore, may
not selectively disclose privileged communications that it
considers helpful while claiming privilege on damaging
communications relating to the same subject.
A court
ultimately must be guided by the subject matter of the:
documents disclosed, balanced by the need to protect the
frankness of the client disclosure and to preclude unfair partial
disclosures. The scope of waiver must of necessity be somewhat
broad and is, in fact, a subject matter waiver, that is, a waiver of
127
all communications on the same subject matter.
Once the attorney-client privilege has been waived, it is forever
gone.1 28 Under the judicial doctrines of claim and issue preclusion,
the client is no longer permitted to use the privilege to safeguard the
122. Kelsey-Hayes, 155 F.R.D. at 172.
123. See, e.g., Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 621-22
(D. Del. 1993).
124. See Genetech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1416 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
125. See, e.g., AKEVA, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 423 ("[Olnce a party asserts the defense of
advice of counsel, this opens to inspection the advice received during the entire course of

the alleged infringement. Consequently, the waiver of attorney-client privilege ... covers
all points of time, including up through trial.").
126. See Saint-Gobain/Norton Indus. Ceramics Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 884 F. Supp.
31, 33 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining that "[tihe basic principle which supports the waiver of

the attorney-client privilege here is fairness").
127. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186-87 (D. Cal. 2001)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also AKEVA, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (stating that

"all opinions received by the client relating to infringement must be revealed, even if they
come from defendants' trial attorneys, and even if they pre-date or post-date the advice
letter of opinion counsel").
128. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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confidential communications at issue. 129 The forward-reaching effects
of claim and issue preclusion could make the waiver of attorney-client
privilege a potentially damaging decision. 130 Because of such a
permanent and damaging effect, giving the waiver of attorney-client
privilege a broad, subject matter scope effectively destroys the
privilege and all of the policy reasons for protecting it.
Although a great deal of the patent law community disagrees,'
the elimination of the adverse inference rule was not the most
efficient answer to the problem created by the friction between the
adverse inference rule and the attorney-client privilege. The real
problem was not the adverse inference itself but what accused
infringers faced in order to avoid the inference-the possibility of a
broad relinquishment of the attorney-client privilege. Since under the
adverse inference rule waiving the privilege risked waiving
confidentiality with respect to all forms of communication between
the lawyer and client in all present and future forums, the rule felt
like an assault on the privilege. This attack on the sanctity of the
privilege is what bothered opponents of the adverse inference rule the
most. Despite the overwhelming distaste for the adverse inference
rule in the patent community, this Comment argues that the adverse
inference rule should have a place in patent law jurisprudence. The
solution to the problem is not to kill the adverse inference but,
instead, to bring some order, logic, and predictability to the scope of
the waiver. Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
should not have used Knorr-Bremse as an opportunity to overturn the
adverse inference rule but instead as a chance to address the scope of
the waiver of attorney-client privilege.
C. Proposed Solution
Because the goals of patent law are different from the goals in
other areas of law, issues unique to patent law should be addressed

129. PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 9:85,

at

9-295 (1993).
130. Id.
131. In Knorr-Bremse, the court invited briefs from third parties to address several
questions. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). On the question of whether an adverse inference
should be drawn when an accused infringer invokes the attorney-client privilege, all
fourteen parties that provided a brief answered the question in the negative. Id. Similarly,
when asked whether the inference should be drawn when no opinion was obtained at all,
all but one brief argued that it should not. Id.
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differently.'3 2 It is highly unlikely that the Federal Circuit's decision
in Knorr-Bremse will be reviewed by the Supreme Court.'33 As such,
this Comment does not argue for a reversal of Knorr-Bremse, but
instead argues that other areas might present a larger problem in
14
willful infringement cases, namely the scope of the privilege waiver.'
Prior to the Knorr-Bremse decision, scholars argued that the
Federal Circuit should dispel the confusion surrounding the scope of
the attorney-client privilege waiver.135 One scholar opined that the
"confusion regarding the scope of the waiver stems from confusion
regarding the willful infringement standard."13' 6 The Knorr-Bremse
court attempted to clear up the confusion regarding the scope of the
waiver by holding that no adverse inference could be drawn as a
result of the failure to disclose or obtain a patent opinion. 37 The
court purported to solve the disclosure problem while leaving the
willful standard intact.1 38 However, as Judge Dyk notes in his
dissenting opinion, the Knorr-Bremse majority may not have
preserved the rule that a potential infringer has an affirmative duty to
discover whether or not his actions are infringing. 3 9 Although an
accused infringer is no longer required to disclose a patent opinion to
avoid the adverse inference, the question remains as to what happens
if the accused infringer does disclose a patent opinion. Further, if the
accused is not required to disclose or obtain an opinion, then the
court is at least handicapped in determining whether the accused's
acts were willful or not.

132. Other scholars have offered solutions to the scope of the waiver problem. For a
detailed discussion of the problems associated with an unclear scope of the waiver of
attorney-client privilege that pre-dates the Knorr-Bremse decision, see generally Jared
Goff, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from the Advice-of-Counsel
Defense to Willful PatentInfringement, 1998 BYU L. REv. 213.
133. The United States Supreme Court rarely reviews patent cases. See id. at 216
(stating that "because the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in patent cases, the
Federal Circuit is essentially the court of last resort").
134. In Part IV of this Comment, infra, a view of the patent system is proposed that
encourages increased efficiency in the system. The combination of these two propositions
offers an alternative to the elimination of the adverse inference rule.
135. See, e.g., Goff, supra note 132, at 236.
136. Id.
137. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
138. Id. at 1344 (holding that "[a]lthough the duty to respect the law is undiminished,
no adverse inference shall arise from invocation of the attorney-client [privilege]").
139. Id. at 1348 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("I do not join the majority opinion to the extent
that it may be read as reaffirming that 'where, as here, a potential infringer has actual
notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to
determine whether or not he is infringing.' "(citations omitted)).
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In terms of the scope of the waiver dilemma, it is important to
note that the complexities of patent law have created problems for
the courts for years. In fact, one reason Congress created the Federal
Circuit was to address problems unique to patent law. 140 Courts have,
from time to time, created, changed, and adapted the rules to better
serve the goals and needs of patent law. For example, before

Markman v. Westview Instruments,4' patent claim construction was
42

an issue of fact for the jury to decide in patent infringement cases.
Allowing the jury to construe the scope of patent claims at issue
created serious problems, for both parties to a patent infringement
suit. The lack of uniformity in jury claim constructions made it
practically impossible to plan a litigation strategy, and it ultimately
led to different definitions for terms of art and different
143
interpretations of the scope of patent protection.
To remedy this problem-a problem unique to the area of patent
law-the United States Supreme Court held that "the construction of
a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court."'" This landmark decision led to lower
courts adopting what are now commonly known as "Markman
hearings.' 4
In these hearings, the parties argue for their
interpretations of the claims before the judge using canons of
construction, the patent specification, and even industry usage of
particular words and phrases.'" The judge, however, ultimately
determines the scope of a particular claim. 147 Typically, the outcome
of the Markman hearing determines the outcome of the entire case:
after the hearing, the successful party, now aware that the claims will

140. See id. at 1343 (majority opinion) ("Fundamental to determination of willful
infringement is the duty to act in accordance with the law. Reinforcement of this duty was
a foundation of the formation of the Federal Circuit court, at a time when widespread
disregard of patent rights was undermining the national innovative incentive.").
141. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
142. Patent claims consist of an enumerated list of elements that comprise several
aspects of the invention and they collectively determine the scope of patent protection.
CHISUM Glossary, supra note 60 (providing definition for patent claim).
143. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391 ("Uniformity would, however, be ill served by
submitting issues of [claim] construction to juries.").
144. Id. at 372.
145. See generally Steven Z. Szczepanski & Floyd R. Nation, A 'Markman' Hearing
Can Determine Case Outcome: It Is Prudent To Have a Litigator Experienced in Drafting
Claims and Getting Them Through PTO, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1999, at C26 (explaining the
process of a Markman hearing).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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be construed in its favor, usually moves for summary judgment on
14 8
issues such as validity or infringement and often wins.
The Markman hearing serves as a good example of how the
courts have created special procedures and provisions that better
serve the goals of the patent system. One of the major problems that
existed before Markman was a lack of uniformity in the construction
of patent claims.149 The Markman hearing addresses this lack of
uniformity and provides a manageable avenue for determining the
scope of patent protection. 150
A similar measure can be used to address the problem with
defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver. This
Comment proposes the creation of a Markman-like procedure in
which the issue of whether a patent opinion is timely, competent, and
justifiably relied upon is an issue of law for the court to decide. As in
the Markman hearing, the procedure would consist of an in camera
review of the patent opinion at issue and any related communications
probative of the issues of timeliness, competence, and reliance.'
Both parties would be allowed to offer arguments as to whether or
not the opinion of counsel was sufficient to give the accused infringer
"sound reason" to believe that his actions were noninfringing, 152 but
the judge would make the ultimate decision as to whether the opinion
was sufficient to provide a good-faith basis for the accused infringer's
actions. In addition, because this procedure would be an in camera
review, provisions should be made such that the communications at
issue would still be protected outside of the hearing. As none of the
contents of any patent opinions would be presented at trial, the
proposed provisions would relieve some of the damaging effects that
the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion currently have on the
waiver. With such a procedure in place, the goal of the patent system
to deter willful infringement of patent rights would be served without
derogating the attorney-client privilege. If operated in conjunction
with the adverse inference rule, this proposed procedure affords
adequate protection to the attorney-client privilege while continuing
to enforce the duty to respect the presumptively valid patent rights of
others.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
150. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996) (explaining
that judges are better equipped than juries to properly construe written instruments).
151. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:
The Eroding Concept of
ConfidentialityShould Be Abolished, 47 DuKE L.J. 853,889-90 (1998) (discussing a similar
use of in camera review to determine whether attorney-client privilege exists).
152. See SRI Int'l v. Advanced Tech. Lab., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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IV. THE ADVERSE INFERENCE RULE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ABOLISHED

A.

Critique of Knorr-Bremse

The attorney-client privilege is a much older judicial construction
than the adverse inference rule. 153 However, when the adverse
inference rule began evolving, the focus was on addressing the
growing problems with disregard for patent rights.'54 In fact, the
Knorr-Bremse court admits that when the adverse inference rule was
conceived the attorney-client privilege was not an apparent issue.'55
However, the rule has evolved over the past twenty years, and the
court now recognizes the inappropriate strains the rule puts on the
attorney-client relationship.'56 One could argue that the burdens
placed on the attorney-client privilege today as a result of the adverse
inference rule are no greater than the burdens placed on the privilege
twenty years ago. Before the adverse inference rule, inventors and
lawyers had no clear incentive for becoming aware of and avoiding
infringing activity.157 Then, under the adverse inference rule,
inventors and lawyers knew that in order to avoid exposure to willful
infringement, an exculpatory opinion had to be obtained and, if
necessary, disclosed. 5 If the proposed in camera inspection of the
patent opinion and related communications with no future preclusive
effect is provided,'5 9 then waiving the attorney-client privilege in
reliance on an advice of counsel defense is indeed a small price to pay
in order to avoid the woes of treble damages for willful infringement.
Abolishing the adverse inference rule wholesale was not the answer.
In fact, the adverse inference rule played a major role in furthering
the goals of the patent system.

153. While the adverse inference rule existed for nearly twenty years, "[tihe attorneyclient privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to
the common law." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (citing 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
154. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating that "[t]hroughout this evolution [of the
adverse inference rule] the focus was not on attorney-client relationships, but on
disrespect for law").
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra Part II.C.
158. See supra Part II.D.
159. See supra Part III.C.
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The Patent System

There are two prominent theories of the patent system typically
adopted by the courts: the "reward" theory and the "contract"
theory."6 The reward theory is grounded in the constitutional power
granted to Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts. 16 The concept behind this theory is that the patent system
encourages innovation and investment in research and development
by rewarding inventors with an exclusionary property right in their
inventions for a limited time. 62
The contract theory, on the other hand, focuses on the
dissemination of knowledge. 63 The goal of the contract theory is to
increase the amount of innovative knowledge available in the public
domain." The basic premise of the contract theory is a metaphorical
"contract" between inventors and the public, where inventors are
given a monopoly on their inventions in exchange for full disclosure
of the invention. 165
Both the contract and the reward theories of the patent system
address different goals. The proposed efficiency theory presents a
more complete view of the patent system by encompassing the goals
of two of the more common theories and encouraging increased
efficiency in the operation of the patent system.
Under the
traditional theories, inventors are encouraged to conduct research
and discover new ideas and then disclose those ideas in exchange for
a patent monopoly.166 But what happens when those monopolistic
rights are disregarded or infringed?
The efficiency theory proposed in this Comment purports to
address this issue. Under this efficiency theory, the patent system is
viewed as a relationship between the government, potential inventors,
and the general public, where a series of obligations and concessions
are transferred between the three parties. The potential inventors get

160. For a discussion of the two theories, see Vincenzo Denicolb & Luigi Alberto

Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents,23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 365,365-66 (2004).
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Denicol6 & Franzoni, supra note 160, at 365.
162. See Denicolo & Franzoni, supra note 160, at 365-66.
163. See id. at 366.
164. See id.
165. See id.; Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil & Ref., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) ("As a
reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade
secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention ....
").The period has since been
extended to twenty years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
166. See Denicolb & Franzoni, supra note 160, at 365-66.
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the opportunity to obtain an exclusive monopoly on their inventions
for a limited time period 167 in exchange for the full disclosure of their
inventions. The general public gets access to new inventions and free
reign to make, use, and sell those inventions without restriction after
the expiration of the monopolistic rights. This satisfies the incentive
and dissemination goals of the reward and contract theories,
respectively. However, under the efficiency theory, in return for the
embarrassment' 68 of granting a limited monopoly at the expense of
disseminating ideas to the public, the government explicitly requires
potential inventors and the general public to exercise due care in
respecting the exclusive rights granted to other inventors for the
duration of the patent monopoly. Under this proposed view of the
patent system, the requisite due care is not triggered by actual notice
of a patentee's rights. 69 The duty is a standing obligation on the part
of potential inventors and the general public alike. To put it another
way, under the proposed conceptualization of the patent system, once
a patent monopoly is granted, the universe of potential inventors and
the general public are put on constructive notice of these patent rights
and are immediately charged with the duty to avoid infringing these
rights. This constructive notice concept is familiar in other areas of
intellectual property law. For example, in trademark law, the
Lanham Act 70 provides that once a trademark is registered on the

principle registry, nationwide protection is granted and the whole
world is charged with constructive notice of the owner's trademark
rights. 7' The constructive notice requirement also has some history
in patent law. Although the patent statutes do not provide for
constructive notice on their face, at least one court has held that a
patent grant confers constructive notice upon the world of the
existence of the patentee's rights. 72 So, while constructive notice is
167. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
168. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (noting Thomas Jefferson's
perception of the difficulty of "drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not"). Monopolies
work against the basic principles of capitalism. The benchmark of capitalism is the
concept of free enterprise and competition. This Comment suggests that the idea of
granting a monopoly to inventors is embarrassing to those who believe in the basic
principles of our capitalistic society.
169. But see Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that the potential infringer's affirmative duty commences upon
actual notice of the patentee's rights).
170. Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 1, 76 Stat. 769 (1975).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000).
172. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat'l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 295 (1940) (asserting
that once patents are filed in and granted by the PTO, "[c]onstructive notice of their
existence goes thus to all the world").
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not explicit in the wording of the patent statutes, it at least has some
underpinnings in patent jurisprudence.
Under the adverse inference rule, courts required potential
infringers to obtain opinion of counsel once the "potential infringer
[had] actual notice" of a patentee's rights.173 Assuming the duty of
care required under the efficiency theory includes the duty to obtain a
timely and competent patent opinion, then that duty is immediately
triggered at the time a patent is granted and continues throughout the
duration of the patent monopoly.
The standing obligation to
affirmatively avoid patent infringement better serves the goals of
patent law than does the actual notice trigger. Requiring actual
notice as a trigger to initiate the duty of care puts an undue burden on
patentees to persistently police the everyday activities of the general
public in order to enjoy their lawful benefits under the patent system.
Under the current actual notice rule, patentees have the burden of
taking extreme measures to ensure that every potential infringer has
actual notice of the patentee's rights. Further, the actual notice
requirement gives the general public, as potential infringers, wide
latitude in their ability to disregard or refuse to become aware of
patentees' rights. If there is no actual notice, then the standard of
care to avoid infringing those rights is practically nonexistent. This
situation contributes greatly to the inefficiency of the patent system.
Patentees should not have to bear such a burden. One of the
primary goals of the patent system is to provide incentives to engage
in research and development so that society can make useful progress
in technology and science."' Gaining a monopoly on an invention for
a limited duration is the incentive the patent system provides. But,
once an inventor has achieved the requisite progress and secured her
monopoly, she is required to expend even greater efforts to protect
that monopoly, seriously calling into question the incentive of the
patent system. For this reason alone, the efficiency theory of the
patent system is superior to the more traditional views of the system.
The efficiency theory places the burden of respecting and protecting
the government's monopoly grant, not on the patentee, but on
potential inventors and members of the general public, all of whom
may one day wish to avail themselves of the benefits of the patent
system. Removing the burden from the patentee and placing it on the
public at large increases the substance and validity of the patent
monopoly. Consequently, the incentive to engage in progressive

173. UnderwaterDevices, 717 F.2d at 1389 (emphasis added).
174. See Denicolb & Franzoni, supra note 160, at 366.
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research and development is increased and patentees get to realize
the full reward for disclosing their new inventions, furthering the
goals of the patent system.
The efficiency theory is essentially an application of a standard
efficiency argument to the patent context.'75 In a general torts
17 6
context, liability is typically allocated to the lowest cost avoider.
That is to say, courts reach an efficient result by determining "which
of the parties ...is in the best position to make the cost-benefit
analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to
'
act on that decision once it is made."177
In the context of patent
infringement, this Comment argues that the constructive notice
element of the proposed efficiency theory reflects society's notion
that the general public can avoid infringement of an issued patent
more cheaply-by availing itself of competent counsel-than the
patentee can by monitoring the activities of the public.
One might quarrel with the proposed efficiency theory on the
grounds that it weighs heavily on the side of patentees' rights. In
particular, it seems that the proposed theory provides patentees with
all of the system's benefits while charging them with none of the
burdens. Whether that criticism is correct depends on whether one
looks at the system ex post or ex ante. An ex post view of the system
would begin the analysis once everyone's position is determinedbasically after a patent is granted. From this viewpoint, the patentee
has her patent and is discharged from any remaining duties17 8 under
the theory, while potential inventors and the public at large continue
to have the duty to become aware of the patentee's rights and seek
the advice of counsel prior to engaging in any activity that could
potentially infringe those rights.
This ex post view overlooks an essential part of the system.
Before a patent is ever granted, the patentee is among the general
public and potential inventors. Therefore, looking at the system from
an ex ante perspective, the efficiency theory charges a potential
175. Standard efficiency arguments allocate burdens and responsibilities based on the
relative positions of the parties involved. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 47, at
1093-98 (discussing the role efficiency plays in the selection of entitlements); see also
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1056-60 (1972) (discussing Learned Hand's formula for efficiently allocating
accident costs and the costs of accident avoidance).
176. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 175, at 1060.
177. Id.
178. The patentee would be discharged from duties only with respect to that particular
patent, of course. Under the efficiency theory, the patentee would still be charged with a
standing duty to avoid infringing the patent rights of other patentees.
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patentee, before a patent is ever granted, with the same duty it
charges the general public with once the patent rights accrue. That
duty is to take affirmative steps to avoid infringing the constructively
known patent rights of others and, ultimately, to obtain an opinion of
counsel. The standing affirmative duty produces two immediate
results: (1) only the truly new, useful, and nonobvious inventions will
make it to the patent office179 and (2) a competent and more thorough
prior art search18 is conducted and compiled prior to the patent
application arriving in the hands of a patent examiner.
Charging patent applicants with constructive knowledge of the
universe of currently valid patent rights and requiring them to take
affirmative steps to avoid infringing those rights increases the
knowledge an inventor has at the time of the invention. Therefore,
an inventor is more knowledgeable about the state of the art or
science before deciding to seek exclusive rights to her invention. The
inventor can avoid wasting enormous sums of money 181 in pursuing a
patent that ultimately fails to meet the statutory requirements of
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness by researching the scope of
current patent rights. If the patentability of the invention is
questionable, the inventor is likely to forgo pursuing the patent and
resort to other forms of intellectual property protection, if any at
all. 82 Because of the expressed duty of care associated with the
proposed efficiency theory, a potential inventor has the ability to
make a more informed decision about whether to patent her
invention or not. 183 The efficiency of the patent system will increase
because the number of patent applications is likely to decrease.
179. In order to be eligible for a patent grant, the Patent Act requires that the
invention is new, useful, and nonobvious at the time of the invention. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103 (2000).
180. A prior art search is used to produce references used in the examination of a
patent. See CHISUM Glossary, supra note 60 (defining prior art). The references indicate
the disclosed areas of the art in light of which the proposed invention was examined. Id.
181. Current filing, searching, examination, and maintenance fees are listed on the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office's ("USPTO's") website. See http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2005octOl.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
182. Another option would be to keep the invention a secret and seek protection
through trade secret law. See Mark D. Janis, Supplemental Forms of Intellectual Property
Protection for Plants, 6 MINN. J. L. SCi. & TECH. 305, 311-12 (2004) (discussing current
trends in intellectual property law that may influence the "patent versus trade secret
decision"); Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329, 344-46 (1997) (discussing the decision between
patent and trade secret protection).
183. The decision to pursue patent protection would be a more informed decision if the
potential inventor was aware of the universe of prior art and, consequently, the likelihood
of whether a patent would be granted on the invention.
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Applications for unpatentable and worthless inventions likely will not
make it to the patent office, and only the most innovative and
progressive discoveries will be advanced.
The idea of increasing the efficiency of the patent system by
decreasing the number of unpatentable applications arriving at the
patent office is not a new concept. In fact, the Patent Act itself seeks
to address this very concern in its statutory bar provisions.' 84 In
particular, the Act precludes the grant of a patent on an invention
that has been on sale in the United States for more than one year
prior to the date of filing of the patent application.185 The Act also
prohibits the patenting of an invention that has been known or used
by others in the United States or disclosed in a printed publication in
the United States of a foreign country more than one year prior to the
same critical date.186 While these provisions seek to decrease the
number of unpatentable applications being offered for review, their
effectiveness is highly questionable. Each year since 1998, the
number of patent applications filed in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office has increased. 87 Over the same period, however,
the percentage of those applications that were granted United States
patents has steadily decreased. 8 8 Therefore, the provisions outlined
in the Patent Act do not effectively address the problem of
unpatentable patent applications.
Consequently, the proposed
efficienzy theory can eliminate some of the inefficiencies currently
experienced by the patent system.
The second immediate benefit of the efficiency theory is the
compilation of a more competent and thorough prior art search
before the examination of the patent application. The importance of
this result cannot be overstated.
A more thorough and
comprehensive compilation of prior art included as references in the
patent application directly increases the efficiency of patent
examiners by decreasing the time examiners currently spend
searching for prior art related to the invention in question. 189 As a
result of this decreased search time, examiners can pass on and make
a determination of the patentability of an application more quickly.
A more comprehensive prior art search ultimately increases the
184. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 102(a).
187. Filing statistics from 1963 to 2004 can be accessed online at the USPTO's website.
See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taflusstat.htm (last visited Feb. 18
2006).
188. See Table 1 and Figure 1 shown in the Appendix to this Comment.
189. See MANUAL PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 904.02 (8th ed., rev. 4 2005).
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duration of the monopoly grant since a patent's benefits extend from
the time of filing the patent application.
It is important to note that Congress created the patent system
under its enumerated powers in the Constitution. The Constitution
does not make patents or patent rights a constitutional guarantee, but
merely empowers Congress to enact laws that promote the progress
of science. 190 In response to this grant of power and the social desire
to provide incentives for progressive work in the fields of science and
technology, Congress created the patent system.191 Both potential
inventors and the general public are beneficiaries of the patent
system. 192 Both groups get the benefit of finding out what advances
others have made or are making, and both groups have the ability to
obtain their own monopolistic rights if they make advances.1 93 For
the reasons articulated above, the patent system should operate under
the proposed efficiency theory. The standing duty of care associated
with the efficiency theory is best encouraged and enforced when the
efficiency theory operates in conjunction with the adverse inference
rule.
The adverse inference rule provided one way of ensuring that
potential inventors and the public upheld their obligations to the
government.1 94 The rule forced potential inventors and the public to
take reasonable steps to avoid breaching the rights of inventors or
face serious and potentially economically damaging consequences. 195
The resulting process of obtaining and disclosing reasoned patent
opinions exhibited a perfect implementation of the duty of care
contemplated by the proposed efficiency theory. Eliminating the
adverse inference rule has effectively taken away the obligations of
potential inventors and the general public, while maintaining the
government's obligations to these parties. 96 If a realized duty of care
on the part of potential inventors and the general public to avoid
patent infringement is not present and, more importantly, not
enforced, then the quid pro quo inherent in the patent system is
destroyed.

190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 1 CHISUM, supra note 60, § 2 (discussing the
constitutional enablement of the earliest versions of the Patent Act).
191. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 60, § 2 (discussing the constitutional enablement of the
earliest versions of the Patent Act).
192. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part IV.A.
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But the patent system does not exist in a vacuum. It operates
within the confines of our judicial system, and the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege cannot be taken lightly. Doing so will
eviscerate the art of zealous advocacy. However, the attorney-client
privilege cannot and should not be used to undermine the basic
purpose of the judicial framework-to seek truth and administer
justice.197 Fundamental to that purpose is the unbending duty to
respect the law. Although the Federal Circuit asserted in KnorrBremse that the "duty to respect the law is undiminished,"'98 the court
justified overturning the adverse inference rule on the grounds that
"the 'conceptual underpinnings' of [Underwater Devices] have
'
significantly diminished in force." 199
However, the very reason the
adverse inference rule came about was to ensure proper respect for
the law and the rights given to patented inventors. So which is it? If
the duty to respect the law has not diminished, then neither has the
conceptual foundation of the adverse inference rule.
Because
enforcing the duty to respect the law is at the core of the adverse
inference rule, discarding the rule undoubtedly blurs, if not totally
eradicates, the requirement that people respect the legal patent rights
of others.
Further, in support of the abolition of the adverse inference rule,
the American Bar Association claims that the rule "penalizes candor
and changes what should be candid advice into advocacy." '
In
essence, the ABA argues that the forced disclosure of patent opinions
as a result of the adverse inference rule inevitably forced lawyers to
produce "sanitized opinions" instead of giving candid advice.2 1
Therefore, the ABA sought the removal of the adverse inference rule
because it believed the rule derogated the foundations of the
attorney-client relationship2 2 and impaired the lawyer's ability to
197. STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITHIN THE SEVENTH FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT pmbl. (1992), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/
civility_7th_fed.pdf ("In fulfilling our duty to represent a client vigorously as lawyers, we
will be mindful of our obligations to the administrationof justice, which is a truth-seeking
process designed to resolve human and societal problems in a rational, peaceful, and
efficient manner." (emphasis added)).
198. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
199. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
200. See Corrected Brief of the American Bar Ass'n, supra note 109, at 6.
201. Id.
202. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344 ("Although this court has never suggested that
opinions of counsel concerning patents are not privileged, the inference that withheld
opinions are adverse to the client's actions can distort the attorney-client relationship, in
derogation of the foundations of that relationship.").
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render candid advice. Although there is indeed some degree of
friction between the. adverse inference rule and the attorney-client
privilege, this friction should not be a ground for abolishing the rule.
In fact, the ABA's argument is essentially using the attorney-client
privilege as an end run around the professional responsibility of
attorneys-the duty of candor.
C. ProfessionalResponsibility of Lawyers
In viewing the patent system under the efficiency theory
discussed in Part IV.B, a discussion of the effect the particulars of the
theory has on the professional responsibility of an opinion-writing
patent attorney is needed. Contrary to the ABA's argument that the
adverse inference rule effectively makes patent attorneys assume the
role of an advocate, lawyers writing patent opinions are not advocates
and, in fact, should not be allowed to become advocates.2 °3 In the
patent opinion writing context, they should be considered counselors
and advisors. Their sole responsibility should be to assess what issues
with respect to patent infringement, validity, and scope arise as a
result of the client's proposed course of conduct and offer an opinion
as to the client's position with respect to these issues. Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers acting as advisors are
required to render unbiased and candid opinions.2" The argument
that the adverse inference rule should be abolished because patent
lawyers are acting as advocates by writing biased opinions in order to
protect their clients' interests should fall on deaf ears in any
American court. American lawyers, especially those acting in
advisory roles, are bound by the duty to render candid advice.2 °5 No
court should allow blatant and unprofessional breaches of this duty to
serve as good cause for removing a judicial rule that has brought
order and respect and has the potential to bring increased efficiency
to the American patent system.
CONCLUSION

The adverse inference rule offered much-needed support to a
then-weak duty of care with respect to patent rights. The rule forced
businesses not only to become aware of the patent activity of others,
but also to take affirmative steps to avoid engaging in infringing
203. See supra Part II.C (suggesting that patent attorneys are guardians of the patent
system).
204. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003) ("In representing a client,
a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.").
205. See id.
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conduct. Unfortunately, the tension the rule created with the
attorney-client privilege led to its eventual demise in Knorr-Bremse.
The death of the adverse inference rule was untimely. The problems
the rule created with the attorney-client privilege could have been
solved by tailoring a judicial scheme that properly addressed the
scope of the waiver of privilege. The Markman-like procedure
proposed by this Comment affords patentees the opportunity to
conduct discovery of the patent opinions obtained by accused
infringers, while ensuring that defendants contain the confidentiality
of the communications. This procedure is a better solution than the
total elimination of the adverse inference rule. The patent system, as
it exists today, suffers from a steady decline in efficiency. This
problem is addressed by the proposed efficiency theory that imposes
a standing duty to become aware of and avoid infringing patentees'
rights by obtaining reasoned patent opinions. When acting in
conjunction with the adverse inference rule, the efficiency theory
encourages patent lawyers to honor their sworn duty to render candid
advice, furthers the incentive goals of the patent system, and protects
and enforces the basic duty to respect the law.
WILSON L. WHITE
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APPENDIX

Table 1: Patent Statistics 1998-2004

Figure 1: Graphical Depiction of Patent System Efficiency 1998-2004
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* This data can be obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
website: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm. The percentages
were obtained by dividing the number of patents granted by the total number of
applications filed in that particular year.

